


Lecture Notes:



- **Mobile OS:**
- History of mobile OSes:
 - Early smart devices are PDAs (touchscreen, Internet).
 - Symbian is the first modern mobile OS. It was released in 2000 and ran in Ericsson R380, the first "smartphone" (mobile phone + PDA). It only supported proprietary programs.
 - Many smartphone and mobile OSes followed after:
 - Palm OS (2001)
 - Windows CE (2002)
 - Blackberry (2002)
 - Introduction of iPhone (2007) ← This was a game changer
It had 4GB flash memory, 128 MB DRAM, and multi-touch interface.
Originally, it only ran iOS proprietary apps but the App Store opened in 2008 and allowed third party apps.
- Design considerations for mobile OS:
 - Resources are very constrained:
 - Limited memory
 - Limited storage
 - Limited battery life
 - Limited processing power
 - Limited network bandwidth
 - Limited size
 - User perception are important: Latency \gg throughput.
Users will be frustrated if an app takes several seconds to launch.
 - The environment is frequently changing. Cellular signals change from strong to weak and then back to strong.
- Process management in mobile OS:
 - On a desktop/server, an application = a process. This is not true on mobile OSes.
 - On mobile OSes:
 - When you see an app present to you it does not mean an actual process is running.
 - Multiple apps might share processes.
 - An app might make use of multiple processes.
 - When you close an app, the process might be still running.
 - Multitasking is a luxury in mobile OS.
 - Early versions of iOS did not allow multi-tasking mainly because of battery life and limited memory.
 - Only one app runs in the foreground. All the other user apps are suspended.
 - The OS's tasks are multi-tasked because they are assumed to be well-behaving. Starting with iOS 4, the OS APIs allow multitasking in apps but are only available for a limited number of app types.
- Memory management in mobile OS:
 - Most desktop and server OSes today support swap space.
 - Mobile OSes typically do not support swapping.
 - iOS asks applications to voluntarily relinquish allocated memory.
 - Android will terminate an app when free memory is running low.
 - App developers must be very careful about memory usage.

- Storage in mobile OS:
 - App privacy and security is hugely important in mobile devices.
 - Each app has its own private directory that other apps cannot access.
 - The only shared storage is external storage.
- Android:
 - History of Android:
 - Android Inc was founded by Andy Rubin et al. in 2003.
 - The original goal is to develop an OS for a digital camera.
 - Later, the focus shifted on Android as a mobile OS.
 - Android was later bought by Google.
 - Originally, no carrier wanted to support it except for T-Mobile. While preparing for the public launch of Android, the iPhone was released.
 - Android 1.0 was released in 2008 (HTC G1).
 - In 2019, Android has ~87% of the mobile OS market while iOS has ~13%.
 - Android OS stack:




- Linux kernel vs. Android kernel:
 - The Linux kernel is the foundation of the Android platform.
 - However, there are a few tweaks:
 - binder - interprocess communication mechanism
 - shmem - shared memory mechanism
 - logger
- Android runtime:
 - **Runtime:** A component provides functionality necessary for the execution of a program. E.g. scheduling, resource management, stack behavior, etc
 - Prior to Android 5.0 (Dalvik):
 - Each Android app has its own process, runs its own instance of the Dalvik virtual machine (process virtual machine).
 - The VM executes the Dalvik executable (.dex).
 - The Dalvik virtual machine is register-based compared to stack-based of a JVM.
 - After Android 5.0 (ART):
 - Backward compatible for running Dex bytecode.
 - New feature - Ahead-Of-Time (AOT) compilation.
 - Improved garbage collection.

- Android process creation:
 - All Android apps derive from a process called Zygote.
 - Zygote is started as part of the init process.
 - It preloads Java classes, resources, and starts the Dalvik VM.
 - It registers a Unix domain socket.
 - It waits for commands on the socket.
 - It forks off child processes that inherit the initial state of VMs. It uses Copy-on-Write only when a process writes to a page will a page be allocated.
- Java API framework:
 - The main Android OS from app point of view.
 - It provides high-level services and environment to apps.
 - It interacts with low-level libraries and Linux kernels.
 - Some components:
 - Activity Manager - manages the lifecycle of apps.
 - Package Manager - keeps track of apps installed.
 - Power Manager - wakelock APIs to apps.
- Native C/C++ libraries:
 - Many core Android services are built from native code.
 - They require native libraries written in C/C++.
 - Some of them are exposed through the Java API framework as native APIs such as the Java OpenGL API
- Android Binder IPC:
 - Android Binder IPC allows communication among apps, between system services, and between app and system service.



- Binder is implemented as an RPC:
 1. Developer defines methods and object interface in an .aidl file.
 2. Android SDK generates a stub Java file for the .aidl file and exposes the stub in a Service.
 3. Developer implements the stub methods.
 4. Client copies the .aidl file to its source.
 5. Android SDK generates a stub (a.k.a proxy).
 6. Client invokes the RPC through the stub.
- Binder information flow:



- **OS Security:**
- Protection:
 - File systems implement a protection system:
 - Who can access a file?
 - How can they access it?
 - A protection system dictates whether a given action performed by a given subject on a given object should be allowed.
 - E.g. You can read and/or write your files, but others cannot.
 - E.g. You can read "/etc/motd", but you cannot write it.
- DAC vs MAC:
 - **DAC (Discretionary Access Control):** Users define their own policy on their own data.
 - **MAC (Mandatory Access Control):** The administrator defines a system level policy to control the propagation of data between users.
 - DAC and MAC are not exclusive and can be used together.
- Discretionary Access Control:
 - Unix protection on files:
 - Each process has a User ID and one or more group IDs.
 - The system stores the following with each file:
 - The user who owns the file and the group the file is in.
 - Permissions for users, any one in the file group, and other.
 - This is shown by the output of the "ls -l" command.
 - Unix protection on directories:
 - Directories have permission bits, too.
 - The write permission on a directory allows users to create or delete a file.
 - The execute permission allows users to use pathnames in the directory.
 - The read permission allows users to list the contents of the directory.
 - The special user root (UID 0) has all privileges. It is required for administration.

- Unix permissions on non-files:
 - Many devices show up in the file system.
E.g. /dev/tty1
 - They have permissions just like for files. However, other access controls are not represented in the file system.
E.g. You must usually be root to do the following:
 - Bind any TCP or UDP port number less than 1024.
 - Change the current process's user or group ID.
 - Mount or unmount most file systems.
 - Create device nodes (such as /dev/tty1) in the file system.
 - Change the owner of a file.
 - Set the time-of-day clock; halt or reboot machine.
- Setuid:
 - Some legitimate actions require more privileges than UID.
E.g. how users change their passwords stored in root-owned /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files?
 - The solution is the setuid and setgid programs.
Run with privileges of the file's owner or group.
Each process has a real and effective UID/GID.
Real is a user who launched the setuid program.
Effective is the owner/group of the file, used in access checks.
 - Have to be very careful when writing setuid code.
Attackers can run setuid programs any time (no need to wait for root to run a vulnerable job).
Attacker controls many aspects of the program's environment.
- Unix security hole: Even without root or setuid attackers can trick root owned processes into doing things.
- Mandatory Access Control:
 - Mandatory access control (MAC) can restrict propagation.
E.g. A security administrator may allow you to read but not disclose the file.
 - MAC prevents users from disclosing sensitive information whether accidentally or maliciously.
E.g. Classified information requires such protection.
 - MAC prevents software from surreptitiously leaking data. Seemingly innocuous software may steal secrets in the background (Trojan Horse).